During the next few decades the populations of most developed countries will grow older and older as a result of the low fertility rates since the 1970s and/or the continuously increasing life expectancy. Generational Accounting which was introduced in the early nineties, can illustrate the effects of this ageing process on a country's fiscal situation. We quantify for Austria how unsustainable its public finances are due to the demographic development. We show that despite recent reforms of the pension and health systems the demographic development produces a major problem for Austria's coffers. Furthermore we compare our results to similar calculations for Germany and Switzerland.
Introduction
Austria was one of the flagships of the European Union until the current financial crisis. Blessed with a sound economy, a relatively high growth rate and a formidable low unemployment rate, it was long-term praised as an example, especially for its bigger brother -the former sick man of Europe -Germany. However, as in the majority of OECD countries, Austria's population is ageing and its pay-as-you-go pension scheme as well as its generous social health insurance will get under pressure.
Although the discussion in Austria is as controversial as in any country, its government is already taken measures against these future financial problems of its social security system. In the last five years Austria's parliament passed two pension reform proposals, one in 2003 and one in 2004. The latter one caused an outcry by several groups and policy makers and led to the first national strike since the Second World War. Furthermore, the increasing public health expenditure caused the government to adopt also a reform act in the health sector in 2005. The question is now if all these reform acts are enough to get the Austrian fiscal system in balance.
This study wants to quantify the prior outlined problems and compare our results between the three neighbor and German-speaking countries Austria, Germany and Switzerland. All three countries share similar traditions but their social nets differ in quite a few ways. A comparison can be useful to evaluate different approaches coping with the problems of ageing societies.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes briefly the method of Generational Accounting and the calculation of the sustainability indicators used. Section 3 then reports the sources of our data for the analysis of Austria's fiscal system. To estimate the implicit debt of public coffers in the long-run Generational Accounting needs four kinds of data, a population projection, age-and sex-specific profiles, a general government budget of a certain base year and global parameters (i.e. growth and discount rates). In section 4 we describe Austria's pension and health care system briefly and report the first findings of the sustainability of its fiscal policy. We show the Generational Accounts of the system and discuss them in detail together with our sustainability indicators introduced in section 2. In section 5 we compare our results with findings from Germany and Switzerland taken from Hagist et al. (2008) . Furthermore we give possible explanations for the differences of the countries' sustainability. Section 6 summarizes and concludes the paper. 1
The Methodology of Generational Accounting
To measure the sustainability of a country's public sector we use the method of Generational Accounting developed by Auerbach, Gokhale and Kotlikoff (1991 , 1992 and 1994 . 1 In contrast to traditional budget indicators which are based on annual cash flow budgets, Generational
Accounting is founded on the intertemporal budget constraint and therefore the long-term implications of a current policy can be computed.
Methodology
The intertemporal budget constraint of the public sector, expressed in present value terms of a base-year is: b
(1) The further description of the methodology of Generational Accounting is mainly based on Raffelhüschen (1999) and Bonin (2001) . For an analytical derivation of the intertemporal budget constraint see Fetzer (2006) or Fetzer (2006) . Hagist (2008) gives an overview about the empirical studies with generational accounting along with a discussion concerning critical points in theoretical as well as empirical terms.
In equation (2), denotes the average net tax paid in year by a representative member of the generation born in year , whereas stands for the number of members of a generation born in year who survive until year . To compute the remaining lifetime net payments of living generations, the future demographic structure is specified conducting long-term population forecasts.
Typically, Generational Accountants disaggregate equation (2) even further. To incorporate gender-specific differences in average tax payments and transfer receipts by age, separate aggregation of the average net taxes paid by male and female cohort members is required. The products aggregated in equation (2) The age-specific net tax payment in year of agents born in year can be decomposed as s k
stands for the average tax or transfer of type i paid or received in year by agents born in year , thus of age .
indicates a tax payment, whereas defines a transfer.
Applying the method of Generational Accounting it is conventionally assumed that initial fiscal policy and economic behavior are constant over time. Under this condition it is possible to project future average tax payments and transfer receipts per capita from the base-year age profile of payments according to
where g represents the annual rate of productivity growth. Equation (4) assigns to each agent of age in year the tax and transfer payment observed for agents of the same age in baseyear , uprated for gains in productivity. The base-year cross section of age-specific tax and transfer payments per capita is generally determined in two steps. First, the relative position of age cohorts between themselves in the tax and transfer system is estimated from micro-data
In case of an isolated analysis of public subsystems like health care or public pension as conducted in the following chapters, i is just chosen so that all relevant payment streams are included in the analysis.
profiles. In a second step the relative age profiles are re-evaluated proportionally to fit the expenditure and tax revenues of the base-year.
For living and future generations, division of the aggregate remaining lifetime net tax payments by the number of cohort members alive in year defines the cohort's Generational Account in year :
Generational Accounts are constructed in a purely forward-looking manner, only the taxes paid and the transfers received in or after the base-year are considered. As a consequence, Generational Accounts cannot be compared across living generations because they incorporate effects of differential lifetime. One may compare, however, the Generational Accounts of baseyear and future born agents, who are observed over their entire lifecycle.
Fiscal Gap
To illustrate the fiscal burden of current fiscal policy we use seven sustainability indicators:
3 The starting point for the first indicators are the intertemporal public liabilities which can be computed by the assumption that the intertemporal budget constraint of the public sector (1) is violated:
The amount of intertemporal public liabilities measures aggregate unfunded claims on future budgets, assuming that the present policy will hold for the future. The first sustainability indicator, the fiscal gap ( b FG GDP ), can be derived if the intertemporal public liabilities are set in relation to base-year's GDP ( ). This indicator is akin to the debt quota well known since the Maastricht treaty but it addresses the debt which will occur in the future and in the past:
Future Generations' Burden
How the policy adjustment required to redeem intertemporal public liabilities will affect generations' fiscal burdens is upon the policies addressing this burden. For illustrative purposes, Generational Accounting typically assigns the entire adjustment to future generations which is equivalent to . All tax payments made by members of future born cohorts are adjusted proportionally with the help of a uniform scaling factor k b > θ . The factor θ is set to ensure balance of the intertemporal public budget defined in equation (1): (4). Computing the average age-specific net taxes paid by representative future born agents, the burden for future generations can be illustrated as an absolute difference between the Generational Account of the base-year agent and the Generational Account of the one year after base-year born agent. This is our second sustainability indicator, the future generations' burden:
Revenue and Transfer Gap
The third indicator that illustrates the burden of current fiscal policy is the revenue gap. In this case the scaling factor rev θ θ = reflects the enhancement of age-specific revenues in per cent for all generations which is necessary to close the intertemporal public budget constraint. It can also be interpreted as the ratio of the intertemporal public liabilities to the present value of all age-specific revenues of the fiscal system : OECD (2007a OECD ( , 2007b OECD ( , 2008 Expenditure encompass in expenses for general public services, defense, public order and safety, economic affairs and environmental protection, education, housing and cultural activities. The entry "Social Protection" which is as such reported in OECD (2008) is divided into nine subcategories such as old age pension or family policy after OECD (2007b) . Health expenditure on which this paper focuses are divided into five subcategories, namely the in-and outpatient sector, drug expenses, long-term care and miscellaneous expenditure. Altogether 31 entries of revenues and expenditure are distinguished. Our resulting budget is shown in table 3. In total, revenues were 115.6 billion Euros while public expenditure altogether made 118.6 billion Euros.
This results in a deficit of 3.00 billion Euros. This deficit minus interest payments on the Austrian gross financial liabilities which lay around 7.0 billion Euros led to a primary deficit (surplus) equal to 3.9 billion Euros.
Micro-Profiles
Entries like defense or homeland security which are not paid or consumed in an age-specific way are distributed with a flat per capita profile. Age-and (where applicable) sex-specific microprofiles stem from various sources: Health expenditure profiles are taken from Hofmarcher, Riedel and Röhrling (2002) . Income and capital income tax profiles as well as the age-specific structure of social security contributions are calculated using data from Statistik Austria (2005a) .
Data to calculate the VAT profile is available upon request from Statistik consumer survey. Profiles related to public pension payments and incapacity benefits stem from Pensionsversicherungsanstalt (2005) . Furthermore , unemployment benefits (AMS (2005)), social housing (Synthesis (2005)) and education (Statistik Austria (2005b) ) are also distributed in an age-specific way. All profiles are plotted in the appendix in table A-1. For the budget item "Family Policy" due to missing data we assume that the incidence of the payments depends on the children which we define equal from an age of 0 to 20 years. We know that this is a crucial assumption as often younger children get higher benefits and the incidence could also depend on the parents (e.g. maternity leave). However, we think that it is a reasonable and transparent assumptions and should bias our results only slightly as family policy accounts only for about six percent of the budget.
Growth and discount rate
According to own calculations based on OECD (2006a OECD ( , 2006b ) average growth of GDP per capita over the last 15 years was around 1.9 per cent while the average long-term interest rate (measured by the ten-year Austrian government bond) lay around 4.3 per cent. For reasons of comparison with the other countries discussed later we opt in our standard setting for a growth rate of 1.5 per cent ( ) and a discount rate of 3.0 per cent ( ). To cover the differences between the actual development and our standard scenario, a sensitivity analysis is undertaken in the appendix and discussed in one of the later sections. Differing growth paths and interest rates g r between the countries are generally not considered but can be examined as well via a sensitivity analysis.
Fiscal Policy and Business Cycle
Our analysis reflects the fiscal policy which is represent in the public budget shown in table 3. However, as Benz and Hagist (2008) have shown at least for Germany business cycle effects are negligible. As Austria has similar automatic stabilizers as Germany we think that also in the Austrian case business cycle effects should be only small. A simple accounting of business cycle effects as in Ministry of Finance Norway (2008) is not leading to the desired results as we want to show which are the major drivers of the fiscal gap and how much is the primary surplus responsible.
4.
The sustainability of Austria's fiscal system
Current Reforms of the Social Insurance System
Austria's social system was founded already during the times of the K&K-monarchy at the end of the 19 th century. Then as today it shows similarities to the Bismarckian system of Germany. One cornerstone of the system is the principle of corporatism that leads to complex systems of control and supervision in the selected branches of the social system.
Austria's Public Pension System
The Austrian public pay as you go-pension system is mandatory for every worker except for a small group of self-employed and persons with no or a very low income. Revenues are financed by three sources: Firstly, contributions by the insured which are wage-based, secondly transfers by other social security branches (for example unemployment insurance) and thirdly an allowance by the central government out of its general budget to cover the gap between revenues and expenditure. we take into account the two-step harmonization of the retirement age for men and women and the new indexation of pension benefits according to the consumer inflation rate. To do that we manipulate the profiles according to the reform-measures. For example the change of the assessment period is modeled via an income profile which was the base for the income tax profile. For the indexation of benefits to inflation, we manipulated the growth rate g accordingly. The retirement age is also modeled via a manipulation of profiles. Knell et al. (2006) and Knell (2005) give good overviews over the detailed measures taken in the pension reforms Euro. Table 4 also shows the different categories/entries that are affected by the reform. As we have no information how for example the rise of co-payments for pharmaceuticals will affect the age-and sex-specific consumption of pharmaceuticals we assume that they will do so in an average way i.e. we just lower the scaled micro-profiles in relatively equal amounts (by the same percentage). This assumes that the rationing will affect every cohort male and female in the relative same amount. Furthermore we hold the modeled effects constant over the years. This may seem as rather strong assumptions however with no more detailed information at hand the 8 A good overview about the certain measures of the health care reform can be found in Hofmarcher (2005) .
first one seems hardly to handle otherwise while the latter could be seen as a policy scenario as the estimations of the overall effects in table 4 are. One could also argue that the effects diminish after a certain amount of time, however, our assumption seems plausible in almost the same manner. 
Sustainability Analysis
In this section we want to present the intergenerational redistribution through the Austrian fiscal policy per se and the changes due to the presented reform measures. Furthermore we want to discuss how the reforms will affect Austria's fiscal sustainability along our presented sustainability indicators i.e. the fiscal gap, the revenue and transfer gaps and the future generations' burden. Figure 1 shows the Austrian Generational Accounts for three different scenarios. First, we present the pre-reform accounts, than the accounts including the pension reforms described above and finally the accounts with both reform measures i.e. health and pension reforms. All three scenarios plotted in figure 1 look like the usual sinus-shaped pattern. 9 Young generations except the ones very close to their birth have to pay a relatively high amount of net taxes over their remaining lifecycle. It is the cohort of 28-year-olds who has to remit the maximum net payment in every scenario.
Generational Accounts pre-and after reforms
The main beneficiary generation is the 65-year-old. As one can see, every representative newborn receives over at least 74,000 Euros more over his/her lifecycle than he/she has to contribute to the public budgets. Alone from this fact it can be stated that a higher fertility rate per se will not cure Austria's coffers but rather will hurt it. However, the pension and health reform have reduced the net transfers of all living generations significantly. The question now is if all generations are affected in the same way or which generations are mostly affected by the reform measures. As one cannot compare generational accounts between living generations as only the remaining life-cycle is considered we have computed annuities out of the differences between pre-and post-reform generational accounts to derive which generations are affected in which way by both pension and health reform (figure 2).
The annuities in figure 2 show a very interesting pattern. The black columns are the surplus load of generations induced by the pension reform while the shaded columns stand for the surplus 9 The sinus-shaped characteristics of the Generational Accounts can be explained by the age-specific economic activity and by the discounting of payments/benefits. The discounting is also responsible for the decreasing benefits after 65 years. P.a. older generations receive more but not over the remaining lifecycle.
loads induced by the health reform. While the surplus loads increase in the case of the health reform from the present newborn until the generation of 90 years olds and decreases due to the rapidly falling life expectancy afterwards, the pension reform obviously has no clear pattern which generations are hurt more than others. Indeed the generations less hurt are the ones very close to retirement while the generations/cohorts which have just filed for retirement are the ones with the largest surplus load. This is due to the change of indexation from productivity to price inflation and that the generations around 65 and 70 years receive the absolute highest pensions. Also relatively highly hurt are the cohorts from 45 years and less, however, the same clear pattern as for the health reform can be observed. As retirement is closer, the discounting of benefits and so reform outcome is less large than for younger cohorts. The cohorts between 55
and 59 years are the least hurt ones. This is because most reform measures i.e. the increase in the statutory retirement age will take effect after these cohorts claimed pension benefits and because most parts of the 2004 reform are only designed for cohorts born 1955 and later. In total one could say that the surplus load for all cohorts are severe especially the ones induced by the pension reform. But are they enough to make Austria's fiscal policy sustainable? 
Fiscal Gaps and Sustainability Indicators
Weighting the generational accounts of living and future generations with the expected cohort size and summing all up given the growth and discount rate leads us to our first sustainability indicator, the fiscal gap plotted in figure 3. (see table 2 ) leaves necessary intertemporal assets of 74.9 to balance our calculations. This is a remarkable result. Evidently Austria's public finances excluding health and public pensions are overfunded. If one includes both reform measures (the current status quo) the implicit debt of the heath sector shrinks to 188.9 per cent of GDP and the implicit debt of the public pension scheme to 172.2 per cent. As the intertemporal assets stay the same, the overall fiscal gap is post reform at 248.8 per cent.
Our second indicator is the future generation's burden. To calculate this indicator, the intertemporal public liabilities and the number of people in future generations are set in proportion to each other (equation 9). This indicator implies that the entire adjustment assigns to future generations. The burden for future generations can be illustrated as an absolute difference between the generational account of the base-year and the generational account of the one year after base-year born agent (both not including the public debt). The future born 10 The public health sector contains in our definition health related administration expenditure, in-and outpatient services, pharmaceuticals, sickness benefits and other health related expenditures. To isolate the health and public pension schemes on the revenue side, we assume that expenditures in the base year are met by revenues. Furthermore revenues are distributed as equal shares of the overall budget, i.e. as the income tax pays 21 per cent of the public activities it also pays 21 per cent of public health expenditure in our assumed scenario.
generation in Austria pay in the post-reform scenario 22,100 Euros per person more in taxes over their entire life-cycle than they will receive in transfers. On the other hand, the base-year born agent gets a net-transfer over his/hers remaining life cycle of about 74,000 Euros. Therefore, the future born agent has to carry a quite large burden compared to the corresponding living generation. This is also reflected in our last two sustainability indicators, the revenue and transfer gap. Austria's government would have to raise all taxes and duties by 7.3 per cent or could decrease all transfers by 6.9 per cent. Table 5 gives an overview about the sustainability indicators pre-and post-reform. Former studies of the sustainability of the Austrian fiscal policy conclude the same qualitative results as our analysis. The quantitative results between our study and the work of Keuschnigg et al. (2000 Keuschnigg et al. ( , 2001 and Mayr (2005) however differ quite substantially. The discrepancy can be explained by different base years and different assumptions on the growth and discount rate spreads and the development of the Austrian population as well as the missing reform measures. Mayr (2005) reports a fiscal gap of 167.5 per cent of GDP in 1998 given a discount rate of 5 per cent and a growth rate of 1.5 per cent. If we set our parameters equally we derive a fiscal gap of 92.8 per cent (given a different base year). As Mayr (2005) does not include the mentioned reforms we can state that the results are fairly close (as our outcome without reform is a fiscal gap of 217.4 per cent). Keuschnigg et al. (2000 Keuschnigg et al. ( , 2001 report with a discount rate of 4.5 per cent and a growth rate of 2 percent a fiscal gap of 276.9 percent of the 1995 GDP.
Sensitivity Analysis
To analyze the sensitivity of our results relating to our exogenous parameters interest and growth rate, and , and to our different population projections we calculate 15 different cases. Except our standard scenario in the post-reform version, we test four more different settings around this combination: Table 6 shows the fiscal gap for all possible population scenarios combined with the described growth and interest rate settings. How can be easily seen, the extent of the fiscal gap and in the case of Austria depends on the difference between the growth and interest rate. As the spread widens the fiscal gap decrease, i.e. is better, in all of the four scenarios. Due to the pension reform and the indexing of pension benefits to prices, also the absolute value of the growth rate is relevant. Therefore a higher growth rate induces a lower fiscal gap. Regarding our four population projections there is no clear picture. Regarding the fiscal gap it can be stated that the low variant is in all cases superior to the other three, however, this is not very meaningful as with different demographic developments the numerator of the fiscal gap is affected but not the denominator (see also section 5). 12 That is why the other indicators show different pictures but it is not clear cut. However, the scenarios with Eurostat are always superior given every indicator apart from the fiscal gap. This is very interesting as the Eurostat projection is a middle ground between the high and low projection and relatively close to the medium variant. A sensitivity analysis given all indicators can be found in the appendix table A-2.
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A comparison with Germany and Switzerland
Austria's problems concerning ageing and fiscal sustainability are quite similar to the ones of other countries. The relevant research question is if there are quantitative differences between countries, and if how large they are and why they occur. We try to answer the first two questions and want to discuss the latter. Our choice for comparison, Germany and Switzerland, is based on the fact that all three countries have similar cultural and economical backgrounds and comparable welfare and income levels. Outcomes for Germany and Switzerland are taken by Hagist et al. (2008) . This study is also based on the public budgets of the year 2004 and only includes pension as well as health reforms. Figure 4 shows the fiscal gaps for the three countries. According to the comparison of this indicator, Austria lies between Germany and Switzerland. Austria is clearly better off than
Indicators and Analysis
Germany with a fiscal gap of about three times their GDP. Switzerland's however has even a long-term surplus with nearly 100 per cent of GDP.
However, there are flaws in this analysis, especially if you compare between the countries which is our stated goal. For an international comparison the fiscal gap might not be appropriate for several reasons. Firstly, it is an indicator that reacts wildly for changes of the parameters growth and discount rate or more precisely to the growth and discount spread. 13 Secondly, all of the three countries have different demographic developments which will determine their future economic power and so their ability to pay their debts. With a stagnating population, the economic power of Austria will differ in the future compared to Germany's where the population will shrink not only in size but even more in its workforce which co-determines GDP. An appropriate indicator for an international comparison should take these facts into account. 
Percent of GDP in 2004
Implicit Liabilities Fiscal Gap 13 One could solve this problem by a thorough sensitivity analysis but it still would be nice to have a robust indicator for comparison. We think that the fiscal gap for one country alone and for political work is a valuable indicator since it is easy to understand and related to other fiscal indicators like the debt quota.
Our second indicator, the future generations' burden, overcomes at least the second flaw of the fiscal gap. Now two dynamic values, the intertemporal public liabilities and the number of people in future generations, are set in proportion to each other. This ratio accounts for the differences in the demographic development. transfer more resources over the remaining life-cycle to its youngest generations while it tax its working generations harder than Germany. Middle-and old age generations however receive relatively equal transfer in both countries which suggests that Germany's social security systems are not as balanced as Austria's but that Austria's rising population contributes more to the fiscal sustainability problem than it resolves. That is also why the future generations' burden is higher in Austria than in Germany as future generations would have to give up already larger transfers in the first country. Switzerland is in every respect far more balanced than both its neighbors with relatively low net transfers to newborns (and so future generations) and relatively high net taxes of working generations, however all quite low on an absolute level given its economic strength (i.e. its GDP per capita).
Again the problem with the indicator future generations' burden is that it is, like the fiscal gap, very volatile to changes of the growth-discount-spread. That is why we report two more indicators, the so called revenue and transfer gap, which are both very well comparable between the countries because they are sensitive to the different demographic developments and so on the differences in future economic power and because they are not sensitive to changes of the growth and discount rate. All indicators show that relatively spoken Germany faces the biggest demographic challenge, not only because of its demographic development but rather due to the design of its social security system. Revenues must rise about 14.6 per cent from their current level which would lead to a new tax quota of 49.7 per cent of GDP (compared to 43.4 without this uprating).
15
14 Note that the initial transfer quota is calculated excluding interest payments. 15 This demonstrates also why the results of the revenue and transfer gap have to be seen in a relative way because Austria already has a tax quota of 49.7 per cent of GDP without any augmentation of the tax level. For large and middle-sized economic powers like Germany such rises in the level of taxation would also probably result in changes in relative factor prices (depending on which taxes would be increased). Generational Accounting cannot catch these effects. For small open economies like Austria and Switzerland, factor prices would probably not change and so our results could be taken as given. For an analysis of Generational Accounting in General Equilibrium, see Fehr and Kotlikoff (1996) , Raffelhüschen and Risa (1997) and Börstinghaus and Hirte (2001) .
Transfer cuts turn out not to be as large as revenue increases because of their demographic profile. While taxes and duties are mostly paid by the working generations, the transfers are mainly received by the elderly to whom the so called baby boomer generations will also belong in a few years. Due to this demographic leverage effect, transfer cuts do not have to be as large as revenue increases. Austria comes in second with revenue increases of 7.3 per cent. The tax quota would then be around 53.3 per cent of GDP and so even higher than in Germany. Again, transfer cuts would not have to be as large as the tax changes but the difference between revenue increases and transfer cuts is not as large as in case of Germany. Switzerland remains in its relative sustainable position and could even cut taxes about 3.6 per cent or increase its spending of about 3.9 per cent.
Discussion
As one can see the sustainability parameters differ quite substantially between the three analyzed countries. One cause for this which cannot be seen in the above analysis is that in the case of Switzerland, only investment in the health infrastructure and subsidies for health premiums of low-income households are considered as public health expenditure in the international statistics we use. As Hagist (2008) shows, if one considers the mandatory health sector as part of the Swiss public system, the fiscal gap increases from intertemporal assets to nearly zero. However, as it is not clear how one should handle the Swiss health sector, we decided to go with the measurement presented in the OECD statistics.
Another difference between the countries which lead to differences in the sustainability is clearly the different demographic developments. Switzerland may be the oldest economy of the three in 2004, however with a relative high net migration in Switzerland and a rather low one in Germany, the latter will take over. Austria is in the middle with also a relatively high net migration. Furthermore it seems that both Switzerland and Austria tax younger generations between 20 and 40 years relative more that it is the case in Germany. This is very interesting and probably the main cause for lower fiscal gaps, at least in the comparison of Germany and Austria.
Switzerland is so sustainable due to its pension benefits which are indexed only to the half of productivity growth which is in contrast to both other countries where beneficiaries nearly get the full productivity growth rate.
The most missing part in Generational Accounting and especially in an international comparison is the aspect of quality. Austria may look more sustainable than Germany but it has also already a higher expenditure and tax ratio than the bigger neighbor. The relevant question would be if Austrians given their higher taxes are getting better services and living standards than their German counterparts. This is especially relevant if one compares the sustainable levels of taxes or public expenditure. Unfortunately this question remains unsolved and one could only state that Austria is more sustainable than Germany, however, for already higher prices.
Summary and Conclusion
The Austrian population will pass through an ageing process during the next decades which causes that the old-age-dependency ratio rises from currently 27 per cent up to 58 per cent in 2060. This ageing population induces increasing expenditures on old-age and disability pensions together with health and long-term care benefits while the public revenues from wage taxes and social contributions will decrease. At the moment Austria's budget is in (primary) surplus but given the developments described above one wonders if such budget surplus could still be seen in the future? One tool to answer such questions is Generational Accounting which was set up in the early 1990s to evaluate if a country's fiscal policy is sustainable over the long- In comparison with its two German-speaking neighbors, Germany and Switzerland, Austria gets the silver medal when it comes to sustainability. Switzerland is far ahead facing intertemporal assets rather than accumulating debt. This is due to the accounting of public health expenditure and the Swiss pension system, which only gives half the productivity growth to its beneficiaries. However, Austria is still slightly better off than Germany given the reform measures described above but for the price of higher tax rates. As Generational Accounting does not cover any growth effects of higher taxes or net spending on education (one cause for the only minor difference between Austria and Germany with Austria outspending the bigger neighbor by nearly 1.5 times), it remains for future research if really Austria or Germany are better off in the long-run given their current fiscal policy. 
